The most clearly articulated Israeli goal is to stop the rocket attacks on southern Israel. Other goals likely include weakening Palestinian support for Hamas, restoring Israel’s deterrent power and destroying Hamas altogether. While a measured military response was always an option, the degree of escalation currently being pursued will almost inevitably prove counterproductive in achieving these goals.
Ending all rocket attacks. Israel would probably have to impose a prolonged and overwhelming military presence throughout the Gaza Strip, something which is unpopular in Israel, including among its leadership, in order to halt all attacks. Even under such circumstances, which would likely lead to massive casualties, well beyond the current figures and almost certainly including significant IDF losses, one can expect to see other forms of Palestinian armed resistance emerge. These could include guerilla urban warfare, shooting incidents or even suicide bombs from the West Bank and even East Jerusalem, with an increased prospect also of a second front (most likely from Lebanon) developing. The densely populated nature of the Gaza Strip and the difficulty of distinguishing between Hamas-militants and innocent civilians make this a particularly risky move – one almost guaranteed to bog down the IDF, further de-stabilize the region, and trigger intense international pressure on Israel – placing the U.S. in a particularly uncomfortable position. An aerial and partial ground assault may weaken Hamas in the short-run and remove some of its rocket launching capacity, but it is unlikely to stop rocket attacks altogether as some can be produced in fairly basic local workshops.
Israel too recognizes that in the end, the only way to truly halt rocket fire into southern Israel is a diplomatic solution. Throughout the 6-month ceasefire between Hamas and Israel that began on June 19, 2008, there was not a single Israeli casualty. J Street supports an Israeli goal of ensuring a more robust ceasefire the next time around – but prolonging the fighting is likely to make that goal less, not more attainable. The reduced Hamas capacity will be substituted by increased public anger and desire for revenge. Hamas maintains the ability to replenish weapons caches over time and will likely also pursue alternate violent options. Therefore, the US and the Quartet should immediately work to help Israel and Hamas end the violence and reach another ceasefire.
Weakening support among Gaza residents for Hamas. History teaches us that Israel’s attack is likely to have the opposite effect. The civilian casualty rate is very disturbing, and, as we’ve seen in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Afghan-Pakistan border region, once civilians are hit, they rally around their own community, including groups like Hamas, rather than around the foreign government conducting the attacks or around those failing to prevent them (the Abbas-led PA for instance). The Arab street, including Palestinians, is not distinguishing between Hamas and non-Hamas and sees the assault as a general attack on Palestinians. While Hamas is currently controlling the Gaza Strip, their institutions are former and future Palestinian Authority buildings and destroying them damages the infrastructure necessary in the long-run run to bring order to the area.
Restoring deterrent power. Israel likely also aims at restoring its deterrent power in the region following a problematic 2006 war with Hezbollah in Lebanon, by proving its military metal against Hamas aggression. Israel succeeded in establishing its might as a military power through victories in traditional warfare rooted in the 1948 and 1967 wars. However, that is not the reality in Gaza. Israel already has bitter experience of setting an unrealistic bar in unconventional warfare and of being sucked into ground operations against militia forces rooted in the local population. That is what became of Israel’s 18 year presence in Southern Lebanon – ending in a problematic unilateral withdrawal in 2000 and then in the 2006 Second Lebanon War, when Israel’s deterrent image was severely damaged. There, the enemy, Hezbollah, was an amorphous non-state actor. The Second Lebanon War’s unconventional nature posed a major challenge to Israel’s assumption that military power alone could protect its civilians. The same challenge exists today and the longer the violence lasts and Hamas remains able to fire rockets, the more likely Israel will again damage its power of deterrence.
Lebanon and Gaza are not the same. Their terrain is different, their access to outside supplies is different and Hamas is not Hezbollah – not in religious orientation, military capacity or social setting – but many of the same basic rules of unconventional warfare against militant non-state actors are the same. The trend of Hezbollah’s support increasing following the Second Lebanon War is all too likely to be replicated this time. Just as Hezbollah is stronger now than they were before the summer 2006 war, so too does Israel risk bolstering Hamas’s support through this campaign.
On “destroying” Hamas. This goal seems particularly unrealistic. Who would be in control of Gaza once this conflagration is over? Hamas has been the government, law and order, and service provider since it won the elections in January 2006 and especially since June 2007 when it took complete control. Not only does Hamas have deep roots in Palestinian society, it is far from clear that something better will take its place in Gaza. If Fatah rule is re-imposed by the barrel of an IDF tank, then one can expect this outcome to be decisively lacking in public legitimacy or acceptability. The other alternative, anarchy and chaos, may be the worst of all for Israel and the region providing the perfect breeding ground for Al-Qaeda style salafist jihadi groups, which were the only ones able to gain a foothold in Iraq once anarchy ensued.
The stated goal of Israel has not been regime change. Hamas will remain in control and be expected to still impose order, which requires a degree of capacity to do so. Too much Israeli “success” and we are stuck with a Gaza with no central government with whom to make a new ceasefire. This military operation requires a fine degree of calibration and he current missions are making that look ever more difficult to achieve. This is why most Israeli leaders talk today of eventually resuming a ceasefire with Hamas – a known quantity that has proved itself capable of maintaining ceasefires in the past.
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