Israel could have spent the 4-5 months of calm under the June ceasefire [the ceasefire was 6 months but began to unravel in November, even so throughout the six months there were no Israeli casualties] working, with international support, to deepen the ceasefire. Of course Israel had to plan to defend itself and build its military and was rightly concerned that Hamas was strengthening its own capacity. One important component of the June deal was that Israel would ease the blockade on Gaza. This, however, never happened, and the humanitarian situation in Gaza was allowed to deteriorate. Had Israel eased the blockade, it would have created deeper incentives for Hamas and the Palestinian people to renew the ceasefire, giving civilians in Gaza a tangible sense that they had more to lose in a military confrontation.

Israel would have benefited from encouraging more effective mediation channels to Hamas through others, like Turkey and Qatar, instead of relying exclusively on Egypt. Similarly, Israel could have sought greater external pressure from Egypt and the United States to stop weapons from entering Gaza, particularly through the tunnels, while simultaneously improving defense systems and shelters in the south. More regularly opening crossings into and out of the Strip would have decreased the tunnel phenomenon, which currently benefits and strengthens Hamas and hurts civilians the most.

At the same time, Israel could have been working to improve conditions on the ground in the West Bank, including halting settlement expansion and easing check point restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement. These steps would have shown the Palestinian people the benefits of working for peaceful change through diplomacy.

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